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EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS IN EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW: ARE THE DICE 
CAST?t 
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of Eric Stein's outstanding qualities, both as a scholar and as a 
teacher, is his skillful use of the comparative method, for which he can rely 
on an extensive knowledge of, and insight into, different legal systems. 
Quite a few years ago I had the privilege of participating, as a visiting pro-
fessor, in the conduct of his course on European Community Law at the 
University of Michigan Law School. One of the sessions dealt with van 
Gend & Loos 1 and Costa v. ENEL.2 In those two leading cases, the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities expounded its doctrine concerning 
the "direct effect" of certain provisions of the EEC Treaty - i.e., that where 
provisions impose upon the Member States clear and unconditional obliga-
tions and the implementation or effectiveness of the provisions is not depen-
dent on any further act of any State, such provisions create individual rights 
enforceable in the courts of the Member States. 
· To stimulate the discussion and test his students' understanding, Eric 
Stein submitted to them the question whether these cases could be seen as 
an elaboration of Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 3 
generally considered the source of the theory of self-executing treaties. 
Prompted by Professor Stein's incisive queries, the discussion revealed that 
the similarity between "self-executing treaties" a la Marshall and the "di-
rect effect" of the EEC Treaty was only apparent. The Court of Justice's 
underlying theory of the relationship between the EEC Treaty and the legal 
systems of the Member States appeared to constitute a radical departure 
from Justice Marshall's analysis of the relationship between an interna-
tional treaty, declared by the Constitution to be "the law of the land. . . . 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without 
the aid of any legislative provision[s],"4 and domestic U.S. law. Van Gend 
t The views expressed are those of the author in his personal capacity. 
* Head of the Trade Policy Instruments Division, Co=ission of the European Commu-
nities; Associate Professor, College of Europe; Chief Editor, SoCIML-EcONOMISCHE WETGEV-
ING. J.D. 1959, University of Ghent, Belgium; M.C.L. Program, 1959-1960, University of 
Michigan. - Ed. 
I. N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondememing van Gend & Loos v. Neder-
landse administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration) (Case No. 
26/62), 1963 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. I (Preliminary Ruling). 
2. (Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary Ruling). 
3. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
4. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
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& Loos and Costa v. ENEL emerged as construing the EEC Treaty not as 
an international agreement but as a constitutional instrument, and as treat-
ing the enforceability of the EEC Treaty by private individuals as if it were 
a question of domestic constitutional law in a federal system.5 If a compar-
ison to American constitutional law were at all possible, it should be made 
not with Foster and Elam v. Neilson but rather with a case such as McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 6 in which the plaintiff relied on the federal Constitution 
to challenge the validity of an act of a state legislature. 
The Court of Justice was faced with a Foster and Elam issue only nine 
years later, when, in International Fruit, 7 it was asked to rule on the en-
forceability by importers of certain provisions of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Except for the case law on GATT, now well-
established due to the three judgments of March 16, 1983,8 the law as to the 
direct effect of other international agreements does not appear settled, al-
though Kupferberg 9 comes to grips with some of the basic questions. 
The purpose of this contribution is to explore the extent to which the 
"direct effect" doctrine, developed within the Community legal system for 
the purpose of the relations between Community law and the Membe,r 
States' law, has spilled over into the field of the relations between intema:-
tional law and Community law, 10 or, to use a somewhat daring comparison, 
to what extent the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland has been applied in a 
Foster and Elam situation. 
I. GENERAL REMARKS 
Some general remarks seem unavoidable. They will, I hope, e':'en be 
helpful. After a cursory look at the previous case law of the Court of Jus-
5. See Stein, Towards Supremacy of Treaty Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the European 
Economic Community, 48 RIV. DIR. INTERN. 3 (1965). There is a body of opinion that ques-
tions the nature and the extent of the distinction, with respect to enforceability and supremacy, 
between Community law and international law. See, e.g., de Witte, Retour a Costa. La 
primaute du droit communautaire au service du droit international, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY IN-
STITUTE WORKING PAPER No. 49 (Apr. 1983). For a convincing rebuttal, see Tomuschat, Zur 
Rechtswirkung der von der Europiiischen Gemeinscheft abgeschlossenen Vertriige in der Gemein-
scheftsrechtsordnung, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, EUROPARECHT UND STAATENINTEGRATION, 
GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR L.J. CONSTANTINESCO 801, 803 (G. Luke, G. Ress & M. Will eds. 
1983). 
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
7. International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (Nos. 21-24/72), 1972 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219 (Preliminary Ruling). 
8. Societa ltaliana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v. Ministero delle Finanze (Case 
No. 266/81), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731 (Preliminary Ruling); Amministrazione dello 
Stato v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana (SPI) (Nos. 267-69/81), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 801 
(Preliminary Ruling); Compagnia Singer v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Nos. 
291-291/81), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 847 (Preliminary Ruling);seealso Petersmann,Appli-
cations of GA 'IT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 20 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 397-437 (1983) (published too late to be taken into account in this contribution). 
9. Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie (Case No. 104/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 3641 (Preliminary Ruling). 
10. See Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: 
From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 35-73 (1983); 
Bebr, Gemeinscheftsabkommen und ihre mogliche unmittelbare Wirksamkeit, 18 EuR 128 
(1983). 
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tice, an attempt will be made to place the issue of the direct enforceability 
of international agreements by individuals into the broader framework of 
the status of international agreements in the Community legal system. 
A. .Direct Enforceability of International Agreements in Previous Case 
Law 
Although the Court of Justice has considered international agreements 
relevant in one way or another to its decisions in a number of instances, 11 
opinions dealing with the issue of whether an international agreement bind-
ing on the Community is enforceable by private individuals are rather 
scarce. In five instances - International Fruit, Schluter, 12 and the three 
judgments of March 16, 1983 13 - the Court has denied that GATT provi-
sions are "capable of creating rights of which interested parties may avail 
themselves in a court of law."14 
In Conceria .Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiano de/le 
Finanze, 15 however, the Court held that a provision of the Association Con-
vention of Yaounde of 1963 with the African States and Madagascar, which 
prohibited charges having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, was "ca-
pable of conferring on those subject to Community law the right to rely on 
it before the courts."16 In Pabst & Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 17 a 
clause of the Association Agreement with Greece, providing that no party 
could impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of the other party any 
internal taxation in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar 
domestic products, was held to be "directly e.ffective."18 Finally, in 
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, a clause of the free-trade agreement 
with Portugal, whereby the parties agreed to refrain from any measure or 
practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing, whether directly or indi-
rectly, discrimination "between products of one Contracting Party and like 
products originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party,"19 was 
held to be "directly applicable and capable of conferring on individual 
traders rights which the courts must protect."20 
What is surprising is not that this issue arose at all, but that it has not 
11. Pescatore, .Die Rechtsprechung des Europiiischen Gerichtshoft zur innergemeinschafl• 
lichen Wirkrmg volkerrechtlicher Abkommen, in VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUNO INTER• 
NATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE - FESTSCHRIFf FOR HERMANN MOSLER 
661-69 (Beitrllge zum ausll!ndischen Offentlichen Recht und VO!kerrecht Vol. 81, 1983) (listing 
41 decisions, but excluding decisions which refer to the 1950 Brussels Convention on Customs 
Nomenclature). 
12. Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Ulrrach (Case No. 9/73), 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1135 
(Preliminary Ruling). 
13. SPI, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 801; SIOT, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 731; 
Singer, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 847. 
14. Schll1ter, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1157 (ground 27). 
15. (Case No. 87 /75), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 129 (Preliminary Ruling). 
16. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 142 (ground 25). 
17. (Case No. 17/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1331 (Preliminary Ruling). 
18. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1350 (ground 27). 
19. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3660 (quoting article 21 of the Agreement of 
July 22, 1972, between the EEC and the Portuguese Republic). 
20. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3666 (ground 27). 
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arisen more often, or at least that the Court of Justice has ruled on it in so 
few cases. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty grants the Community legal per-
sonality and the capacity to conclude international agreements.21 Powers to 
conclude such agreements are conferred on the Community either expressly 
or implicitly by the EEC Treaty.22 Under these powers the Communities 
had, as of July 1, 1983, concluded 231 bilateral agreements with 118 coun-
tries and had become party to 19 multilateral agreements. Moreover, al-
though no formal legal consequences have been drawn from this 
development, the transfer of powers from the Member States to the Com-
munity which has occurred in the field of external trade has in practice been 
recognized by the other contracting parties in GAIT: the Community par-
ticipates in the administration of the GATT, and negotiates and enters into 
GAIT implementing and side agreements. As John Jackson pointed out, 
the Community had by 1969 already acquired the status of a distinct entity 
in GATT.23 
The majority of these agreements concern, wholly or in part, trade with 
non-member countries. In 1982, imports from and exports to third coun-
tries accounted respectively for 13.33% and 11.88% of the GDP of the Com-
munity as a whole. In the same year, intra-Community imports and exports 
accounted for approximately 13% of the GDP of the Community as a 
whole. In light of this, the considerable imbalance between the well-estab-
lished case law on the Community's ·"interstate commerce clauses" and the 
scarce case law recognizing the right of individuals to rely on such interna-
tional Community agreements is rather surprising. 
Part of the explanation lies in the apparent reluctance of the Court of 
Justice to face this issue. A case in point is Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record 
Shops Ltd.24 RSO Records Inc. and Polydor Ltd., respectively the U.K. 
owner and the exclusive U.K. licensee of the copyright of a sound recording 
entitled "Spirits Having Flown" and featuring The Bee Gees, had brought 
an action before U .K. courts against Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., a re-
tailer. The retailer sold in the United Kingdom records reproducing the 
same song by the same group; these records had been produced and mar-
keted in Portugal" by two Portuguese licensees of RSO, the U.K. copyright 
owner. Simons Records Shops Ltd., importer and wholesaler of the same 
records, was subsequently, at its own request, added as a defendant to the 
proceedings. 
As was established during the proceedings, Simons and Harlequin, re-
spectively the importer-wholesaler and the retailer of the Portuguese 
records, had by their acts infringed section 16(2) of the U.K. Copyright Act 
21. See, e.g., Opinion given pursuant to article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Advisory Opin-
ion No. 1/76, 1977 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 741; Kramer and others (Nos. 3-4, 6/76), 1976 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279 (Preliminary Ruling); Commission of the Eur. Co=unities v. Coun-
cil of the Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 22/70), 1971 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 263. 
22. For the most recent literature, see DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS (C. Tim-
mermans & E. Voelker eds. 1981). See also van Boutte, Intemationa/ Law and Community 
Treaty-Making Power, 3 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 621-39 (1981). 
23. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 102 (1969). 
24. (Case No. 270/80), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 329 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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of 1956.25 That provision, which implements the territoriality principle of 
the protection of copyrights, provides that a copyright is infringed by any 
person who, without the license of the owner of the copyright, imports an 
article into the United Kingdom, if to his knowledge the making of that 
article constituted an infringement of that copyright, or would have consti-
tuted such an infringement if the article had been made in the place into 
which it was so imported. 
Harlequin and Simons claimed, however, that under Community law 
Polydor was not entitled to enforce the rights conferred upon it by section 
16(2) of the Copyright Act. To that purpose they relied on the 1972 Free-
Trade agreement between the EEC and Portugal and in particular on two 
provisions thereof - articles 14(2) and 23 - on elimination of restrictions 
on trade between the two parties.26 These provisions are expressed in terms 
similar to those of the EEC Treaty on the abolition of restrictions on trade 
within the Community (articles 30 and 36). 
There is no doubt that if the records had, as in this case, been lawfully 
produced and marketed by a licensee in one of the Community Member 
States instead of Portugal, the EEC Treaty provisions as interpreted by the 
Court of Justice would have prevented the enforcement by RSO Records 
and Polydor of their U.K. copyrights.27 
The Cot1rt of Appeal stayed the proceedings and asked the Court of 
Justice, under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, to give a preliminary ruling on 
the question whether the Free-Trade Agreement with Portugal was directly 
enforceable by individuals within the Community and on the question of 
how the relevant provisions of that Agreement were to be interpreted. 
One would have expected the Court of Justice to deal with these two 
questions in that sequence. Indeed, how the Agreement should be inter-
preted, with the possible consequence that it would prevail over section 
16(2) of the U.K. Copyright Act, is a question which becomes relevant only 
once it is established that the Agreement is enforceable by individuals. In-
stead of this, the Court of Justice first interpreted the Agreement and found 
that the prohibition against importing a product from Portugal based on the 
exercise of a copyright was, under the circumstances, justified under article 
23 of the Agreement and did not constitute a restriction within the meaning 
25. U.K. Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 16(2). 
26. Council Regulation 2844/72/EEC Concluding an Agreement between the European 
Economic Co=unity and the Portuguese Republic, [Special Edition 1972] O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 301/164) 166 (Dec. 19, 1972). 
27. In a series of decisions involving industrial and co=ercial property rights, the Court 
of Justice developed the doctrine of "exhaustion of rights." Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, 
which permits restrictions in intra-Co=unity trade where such restrictions are justified to 
protect industrial and co=ercial property rights, does not cover the right under national law 
to prevent importation from another Member State of products protected by an industrial or 
co=ercial property right in the importing Member State, if these products have been law-
fully made and sold in the exporting Member State by the holder of the right or with his 
permission. See, with respect to copyrights, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco (Case 
No. 58/80), 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 181 (Preliminary Ruling); Musik-Vertrieb Membran 
GmbH v. GEMA- Gesellschaft fOr musikalische Auff0hrungs- und mechanische Vervielflil-
tigungsrechte (Nos. 55, 51 /80), 1981 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 147 (Preliminary Ruling); Deutsche 
Gra=ophon GesellschaftmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmllrkte & Co. (Case No. 78/70), 1971 E. 
Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 487 (Preliminary Ruling). 
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of article 14 of the agreement. As to the question of direct enforceability, 
the Court of Justice simply noted that in view of the replies given to the 
question of substance, it was unnecessary to reply to the question of the 
direct enforceability of the Portugal Agreement.28 
The Court of Justice thus sidestepped the issue of the enforceability of 
international agreements by individuals. As it had done in several previous 
cases, it managed to avoid the issue by directly interpreting an international 
agreement in a way which avoided a conflict with Community Law.29 With 
respect to the earlier cases it could perhaps be argued that, in so doing, the 
Court of Justice had implicitly recognized the enforceability. After Polydor 
such a reading is no longer tenable; the issue had loomed too large in the 
proceedings. No less than five Member States had participated in it, four of 
which had vigorously defended the view that the Agreement was not en-
forceable by individuals. 
This reluctance of the Court of Justice is understandable in the light of 
the following observations. 
B. The Status of International Agreements 
The question of direct enforceability by individuals of international 
agreements is part of the .broader problem of the status of international 
agreements within the domestic legal systems of the Member States. This 
status involves a series of questions such as: whether, when and how inter-
national agreements become binding on the state and become part of do-
mestic law, whether and how they can be used to interpret domestic law 
and whether, how and to what extent they can be relied upon to review the 
legality of inconsistent domestic law. In general terms it may be said that 
the concept of the "self-executing treaty" may solve some of the difficulties, 
but does not come close to providing the answer to all·the questions which 
arise in connection with the enforcement of international agreements by 
domestic courts.30 
Leaving aside the disputed question of whether domestic or interna-
tional law determines the qualifications of a treaty as "self-executing,"31 
28. Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 350 (ground 23). 
29. E.g., Carciati (Case No. 823/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2773 (Preliminary Rul-
ing); Regina v. Henn (Case No. 34/79), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3795 (Preliminary Ruling); 
Razanatsimba (Case No. 65/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229 (Preliminary Ruling); R. & 
V. Haegeman v. Belgian State (Case No. 181/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 449 (Preliminary 
Ruling); I. Schroeder KG v. Federal Republic of Germany (Case No. 40/72), 1973 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 125 (Preliminary Ruling). 
30. See· the concise but excellent review of the different approaches to these questions in 
various legal systems given by Riesenfeld, The .Doctrine of Self Executing Treaties and U.S. v. 
Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INTL. L. 892 (1980), with numerous references to other 
legal writings. 
31. According to Riesenfeld, supra note 30, at 900, the self-executing character of a treaty 
is a product of international and domestic international law rules; according to Verhoeven, La 
notion d' "applicabilite directe" du droit international, 15 R.B.D.I. 243, 258 (1980), this is an 
international law question; A. BLECKMANN, BEGRIFF UNO KRITERIEN DER INNERSTAAT-
LICHEN ANWENDBARKEIT VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE 138, 231 (Schriften zum c)ffent-
lichen Recht, Band 123, 1970), concludes that the arguments rooted in the domestic legal sys-
tem ought to have the most weight. 
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domestic constitutional law provisions determine in fact, at any rate, the 
enforcement of an international treaty. 
The cautious approach of the Court of Justice on the direct enforceabil-
ity by individuals of international agreements goes hand in hand with the 
fact that it has not, so far, attempted to establish a firm and clear theory on 
the broader question of the status of international agreements in Commu-
nity Law. In all fairness one should add that in its various submissions to 
the Court of Justice the Commission has also failed to develop and defend a 
comprehensive theory in this respect. 
Quite apart from what, to a casual observer, may appear to be a state of 
disarray in international legal thinking, this state of affairs is understanda-
ble in the light of the constitutional provisions of the EEC Treaty and the 
practice followed by the EEC institutions on the one hand, and of the legal 
situation in the Member States on the other. 
I. Institutional Provisions and Practice 
Pursuant to article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, international agreements 
are negotiated by the Commission of the European Communities and con-
cluded, as a rule, by the Council of Ministers of the European Communi-
ties. With respect to tariff and trade agreements, article 113 lays down a 
procedure consisting of a recommendation by the Commission to the Coun-
cil, followed by an authorization by the Council to the Commission to open 
and conduct negotiations within the framework of negotiation directives 
issued by the Council and in consultation with a special committee ap-
pointed by the Council to assist the Commission. In practice this procedure 
has been extended to other agreements. 
Once the text of the agreement has been initialed or authenticated in 
some other form by the Commission, the Council "concludes" the agree-
ment, following either a simplified procedure or a more complicated proce-
dure involving two or three stages.32 In doing so, the Council approves the 
agreement and decides on such steps as are required to express the Commu-
nity's consent to be bound by the agreement by whatever means are 
applicable. 33 
In Community practice, "conclusion," within the meaning of the rele-
vant EEC Treaty provisions (articles 114, 228 and 238), thus covers simulta-
neously two different measures: the measure whereby the internal 
procedure to conclude an agreement is completed and the measure whereby 
the Community binds itself internationally. This final act of the Council 
takes the form of a decision or a regulation. The decision or regulation, to 
which the international agreement is appended, is published in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. A notice announcing the agree-
ment's international entry into effect may appear subsequently in the Offi-
cial Journal. 
Beyond a certain analogy to legal systems providing for legislative ap-
32. For a detailed description, see Louis & Brueckner, Relations Exterieures in 12 LE 
DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE EcONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 35-45 (J. Megret, M. Waelbroeck, J. 
Louis, D. Vignes & J. Dewost ed. 1980). 
33. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 11, UN Doc, 
A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 875 (1969). 
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proval of international agreements, these treaty provisions do not offer 
much guidance on the status and effects of international agreements in the 
Community legal system, except that under article 228(2) agreements "con-
cluded" under these conditions are "binding on the institutions of the Com-
munity and on Member States." 
The institutional provisions are silent on the question of whether and 
how an international agreement binding on the Community becomes part 
of Community law. They do not contain any indication of the Treaty fram-
ers' views on what, for convenience, are called the "monist" and "dualist" 
approaches. The practice followed by the Community institutions does not 
off er much guidance either. In some cases the practice seems to reflect a 
"dualist" attitude; in other cases it reflects a "monist" one. The choice of a 
regulation (by definition "directly applicable") rather than a decision for 
the purpose of approving an international agreement, normally implies that 
a regulation was in that case necessary to ensure direct efficacy to an agree-
ment which was itself considered "self-executing." It can thus be seen as 
the expression of a "dualist" attitude. However, that choice may also be 
influenced by other considerations, such as the need to adopt simultane-
ously complementary provisions requiring the use of a regulation. For its 
part, the Court of Justice has demonstrated that it does not attach much 
weight to the type of legal act used for the purpose of deciding whether an 
agreement has become part of Community law and is directly 
enforceable. 34 
On the other hand, in Community practice, legislation implementing an 
international agreement, i.e., transforming it into Community legislation, is 
considered necessary only where the agreement both entails precise legal 
obligations and requires changes of or additions to rules in force internally, 
or where the provisions of the agreement, in order to be implemented in a 
clear and effective manner, call for special measures of internal law.35 
2. The Laws of the Member States 
In the absence of clear indications in the institutional provisions of the 
Treaty, could the Court of Justice have found in the laws of the Member 
States the elements of a legal theory of the status and effects of international 
agreements which would not be too at odds with the attitude prevailing in 
the Member States? 
In his recent study on judicial enforcement of international agreements 
in the European Community and in its Member States, Pescatore came to 
some remarkable conclusions.36 First, the constitutional systems of several 
Member States operate in such a way that these Member States are in a 
34. In Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze (Case No. 
87/75), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 129, 144, 155 (Preliminary Ruling), the Court of Justice 
allowed the plaintiff in the main case to rely on the Yaounde Agreement although it had been 
approved by a Decision and not by a Regulation. 
35. On the way in which some of the results of the latest GATI Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations were implemented, see Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers 
and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 5, 26-31 (1982). 
36. Pescatore, L 'application judiciaire des traites internationaux dans la Communaute 
europeenne et dans ses Etats membres, in MELANGES PIERRE-HENRI TE!TGEN (forthcoming); 
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position to accept international commitments, while reserving the possibil-
ity of leaving the commitments unimplemented in their territory or imple-
mented only partially or selectively. In other Member States, either 
pursuant to constitutional provisions (e.g., the Netherlands) or as a result of 
judge-made law ( e.g., Belgium), nothing, not even a subsequent inconsistent 
act of Parliament, stands in the way of judicial enforcement ofinternational 
agreements that are by nature capable of such enforcement. Second, some 
Member States adhere to a "transformation" theory. As under U.S. consti-
tutional law, the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle allows the legisla-
ture by a subsequent act to modify in effect the terms of a treaty or even to 
put an end to its effects. Third, in some Member States, under the acte de 
gouvernement or a similar doctrine, which may be compared to some as-
pects of the political question doctrine in U.S. law,37 the judiciary sponta-
neously limits its powers with respect to application or interpretation of 
international treaties. In France, for example, in case of doubt on the inter-
pretation of a treaty, the judiciary is supposed to refer the question to the 
executive branch for a ruling. Fourth, the doctrine of "self-executing trea-
ties" has paradoxical results. In "dualist" Member States this doctrine may 
actually favor the penetration of international law.38 In "monist" Member 
States the doctrine offers the judiciary the possibility of setting aside provi-
sions of an international agreement, by declaring them not self-executing. 
Thus, not only are there substantial differences in the constitutional 
framework, including the possibility of judicial review of national legisla-
tion, which is the ultimate test of the efficacy of an international treaty in 
domestic law, but, in addition, there are no two Member States which have 
regulated in the same manner the technical means to ensure domestic exe-
cution of international treaties. 
C. Relevance of International Agreements in the Community System 
When one tries to find a pattern in the case law on the status and effects 
of international agreements, one is quite naturally tempted to look first for 
answers to the three main questions: (a) does the agreement bind the Com-
munity? (b) does it form part of Community law? (c) is it enforceable by 
private individuals? One would then attempt to establish logical links be-
tween these questions, in order to arrive at an assessment of the responsive-
ness of the Community's legal system to international agreements. Thus, 
one could say the following: question (b) only arises if (a) is answered af-
firmatively; if (b) is answered affirmatively, then, quite logically, the answer 
to (c) must be that the international agreement should be enforceable to the 
same extent as any piece of Community law. 
However, the reality is too complex to be reduced to a neat syllogism. It 
accord Growc, L' •~nvocabilite en justice" des accords internationaux des Communautes 
europeennes, REV. TRIM. DR. EUR. 203, 212 (1983). 
37. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
38. See Waelbroeck, E'!farceability of the EEC-EFTA Free-trade Agreements: A Reply, 3 
EUR. L. REV. 27 (1978). The most remarkable example is the Italian case law granting "direct 
efficacy" to the GAIT via the statute which incorporated it into Italian law. For comments, 
see Sacerdoti, Application of GA 1T by Domestic Courts: European and Italian Case Law, 1976 
ITAL. Y.B. INTL. L. 224 (vol. 2). 
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cannot be summarized by the insufficiently qualified questions of whether 
international agreements are "applicable" within the Community and 
whether they are "directly enforceable."39 This may be illustrated by the 
following two sets of considerations, which to American lawyers will appear 
to be paradoxes of the Community legal syste~. 
The first paradox is that an international agreement does not necessarily 
have to be binding on the Community in order to be relevant to the inter-
pretation and application of Community law. There are the agreements 
concluded by Member States with third countries before the entry into force 
of the EEC Treaty or before the Member State's accession to the Commu-
nity. After this date, under the existing division of powers between the 
Community and the Member States, Member States continue to enter into 
international agreements in fields not preempted by Community action or 
in fields where there is no exclusive Community power. Even with the ut-
most care, it appears hardly possible to prevent frictions between Commu-
nity law and such agreements. How and where should such conflicts then 
be solved? 
There can be little doubt that under international law such agreements 
entered into by the individual Member States must be respected. This 
much is obvious as to Member States' agreements entered into before the 
entry into force of the EEC Treaty, and is reflected in article 41 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Community law itself recognizes 
this expressly. Under article 234, rights for third countries arising from 
Member States' preexisting international agreements and obligations for 
Member States arising therefrom are not affected by the EEC Treaty.40 As 
to agreements entered into subsequently by Member States, it hardly seems 
equitable for them to invoke the invalidity of such agreements, except per-
haps where the third country concerned had been advised, before conclud-
ing the agreement, of its incompatibility with Community law. Yet the 
interpretation of such international obligations cannot be left to each Mem-
ber State's legal system. This would strike at the uniform application of 
Community law, its most fundamental characteristic. There is no other op-
tion than to conclude that, without being binding on the Community, such 
agreements are nonetheless part of Community law, and their observance 
must be ensured by the Court of Justice, under article 164 of the EEC 
Treaty, in its interpretation and application of Community law.41 
This, in tum, sheds a particular light on the attitude of the Court of 
Justice with respect to treaties that are internationally binding on the Com-
munity either because the Community concluded them or because the 
Community has been substituted to the Member States for the execution of 
39. See Pescatore, supra note 11, at 663. 
40. Treaty establishing the European Economic Co=unity, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 234, para. 
1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]; see Co=ission of the Eur. 
Economic Co=unity v. Italian Republic (Case No. 10/61), 1962 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1. 
41. In Attorney Gen. v. Burgoa (Case No. 812/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2787 (Pre-
liminary Ruling), the Court of Justice concluded that even if the Community is itself not 
bound by agreements entered into by Member States before the Co=unity exercised its pow-
ers, it has the duty not to impede the performance of the obligations by the Member State 
which stem from such agreements. 
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such treaties.42 In this respect, it is worth recalling one of the latest GAIT 
judgments in which one of the questions submitted to the Court of Justice 
dealt precisely with its jurisdiction: the Italian Court of Cassation ques-
tioned whether the Court of Justice had:jurisdiction to interpret the GA TT 
in cases other than those where the interpretation or the legality of Commu-
nity measures were at stake. Referring to an earlier judgment, the Court of 
Justice confirmed its jurisdiction on the following grounds: 
[I]t is important that the provisions of GA TT should, like the provisions of 
all other agreements binding the Community, receive uniform application 
throughout the Community. Any difference in the interpretation and ap-
plication of provisions binding the Community as regards non-member 
countries would not only jeopardize the unity of the commercial policy, 
which according to Article 113 of the Treaty must be based on uniform 
principles, but also create distortions in trade within the Community, as a 
result of differences in the manner in which the agreements in force be-
tween the Community and non-member countries were applied in the vari-
ous Member States.43 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this first paradox. First, even 
agreements that are not internationally binding on the Community may be 
held relevant for the interpretation and application of Community law. 
Second, when the Court of Justice takes cognizance of international agree-
ments as part of Community law, or treats them as if they were part of 
Community law, it does so to protect uniform application of Community 
law as much as, if not more than, to enforce international law. 
The second paradox is that, in the Community system, a norm may be 
part of Community law without being enforceable by individuals. Conse-
quently, logic does not compel the conclusion that, once it is established 
that an international agreement binding on the Community has become 
part of Community law, such agreement may be relied upon by individuals 
to review the legality of subordinate Community legislation or even of sub-
sequent acts of the Community "legislature" -i.e., a subsequent act of the 
Council of Ministers inconsistent with the international agreement previ-
ously approved by the same Council of Ministers. Conversely, logic does 
not compel the conclusion that, once it is established that a given interna-
tional agreement may not be relied upon by an individual, the agreement is 
therefore not part of Community law. 
Indeed, Community law proper is not always necessarily enforceable by 
individuals. The quite remarkable development of the "direct effect" doc-
trine should not obfuscate the fact that Community law is also very much 
concerned with regulating the relations between the Community and its 
Member States and that this is as much a part of intra-Community law as is 
42. GATI is a prime example. See, e.g., SP/, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 801; SIOT, 
1983 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 731; Singer, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 847; Douaneagent 
der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen (Case No. 
38/75), 1975 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1439 (Preliminary Ruling); International Fruit, 1972 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1219; see also Pescatore, supra note I I. According to Behr, no hasty 
conclusions should be drawn from this as to the direct effect of an agreement. See Behr, Stlpra 
note 10, at 35, 40. 
43. SP/, 1983 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 828 (ground 14). 
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law having direct effect.44 Not only is that part of Community law binding 
on the Community institutions and on Member States, but it can also be 
relied upon by the Commission or by Member States before the Court of 
Justice and may even be interpreted by the Court of Justice under article 
177.45 
Enforcement of Community law is thus not only guaranteed by "direct 
effect". where appropriate, but also by these other judicial means, in particu-
lar by the possibility that the Commission may proceed against Member 
States for breach of their Community law obligations. This alternative 
means of judicial enforcement also applies to international agreements that 
have become part of Community law. This point was emphasized implic-
itly but clearly by the Court of Justice in one of its recent GATT decisions. 
Although it denied that article V of GATT could be relied upon by the 
complainant in the main case to challenge the application of certain Italian 
port taxes on goods in transit to Austria, it did refer to article V and stressed 
"the Community's obligation to ensure that the provisions of GATT are 
observed in its relations with non-member States w~ch are parties to 
GA TT."46 Even where a provision of an international agreement would be 
capable of having "direct effect" as a similarly worded provision of Com-
munity law, the reasons for considering the Community law as directly en-
forceable may not necessarily apply to international law binding on the 
Community.47 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this second paradox. First, it is not 
true that because an international agreement is part of Community law that 
it is therefore enforceable by individuals. Second, enforceability by individ-
uals is not the only judicial means to ensure application of and compliance 
with international agreements within the Community legal system. 
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: 
KUPFERBERG AND THEREAFTER 
It is now time to tum to the main question raised at the outset of this 
contribution. In those cases where the Court of Justice has held that a pro-
vision of an international agreement is "directly applicable" and "capable 
of conferring to individuals rights which the courts must protect," has it 
transferred to the relationship between international law and Community 
law the doctrine of "direct effect" which applies to the relationships be-
tween Community law and the domestic law of the Member States? 
The significance of this question appears when one considers some of 
the aspects of the direct effect doctrine, as it is set out in van Gend & Loos48 
44. To a very large extent Community law has replaced international law for the purpose 
of regulating relations between Member States in matters falling within the scope of the Com-
munity treaties. For the most recent contribution on this, see Schwarze, Das allgemeine 
Volkerrecht in den innergemeinschqftlichen Rec/ztsbeziehungen, 18 EuR 1-39 (1983). 
45. Impresa Costruzioni Comm. Quirino Mazzalai v. Ferrovia del Renon (Case 111/75), 
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 657 (Preliminary Ruling). 
46. SIOT, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 780 (grounds 27 and 28). 
47. On this distinction see Bebr, supra note 10, at 36-38; Tomuschat, supra note 5, at 803-
04. 
48. 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1. 
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and Costa v. ENEL.49 The doctrine is justified by the legal nature of the 
Community: it represents a new legal order, the subjects of which are not 
only Member States but also individuals; for the benefit of this Community 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights. In addition, the doc-
trine is related to the objective of the EEC Treaty of establishing a common 
market, which implies that the EEC Treaty is more than an agreement that 
merely creates mutual obligations between Member States. Furthermore, 
the doctrine is closely linked to the institutional structure set up by the EEC 
Treaty. The Treaty provides for the establishment of common institutions 
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States 
and also their citizens. It also grants jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to 
ensure a uniform interpretation of Community law by national courts. Fi-
nally, the direct effect doctrine has, as a corollary, the supremacy of Com-
munity law over inconsistent national law. 
Apart from its implications for the status and the efficacy of interna-
tional agreements within the Community legal system in general, the ques-
tion of direct effect has, for trade agreements such as the Portugal 
Agreement, some potentially wide-ranging specific implications. All Com-
munity trade agreements - e.g., its Association agreements and the Lome 
Convention concluded with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States -
contain clauses that are expressed in terms identical or similar to those of 
the EEC Treaty on the abolition of restrictions on intra-Community trade. 
It is as if the United States had inserted the interstate commerce clause in its 
trade agreements. Not only has the Court of Justice recognized the "direct 
effect" of those EEC Treaty provisions on which the trade agreement 
clauses are based, it has also interpreted them very broadly in accord with 
the aims of the EEC Treaty and the economy thereof, in a fashion reminis-
cent of the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the basic tenets of the 
U.S. Constitution.50 A characteristic example is the prohibition in article 
30 of the EEC Treaty of "measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions," and the article 36 exceptions dealing with national import re-
strictions justified on the ground of protection of industrial and commercial 
property rights. 51 
As the Court of Justice dealt at some length with the underlying issues 
in Kupferberg, the attempt to find an answer to our question will be made 
with the help of that decision. The decision of the Court of Justice in 
Kupferberg arose from a case pending before the Bundesfinanzhof, Ger-
many's highest court for fiscal matters, in which Christian Adalbert 
Kupferberg KGA and the Hauptzollamt Mainz, a principal German cus-
toms office, were litigating the application to port wines of a "monopoly 
equalization duty," levied under the German law on the (State) Monopoly 
49. 1964 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 585; see text at notes 1-2 supra. 
50. See, e.g., Blasi, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Stales 10 Regulate t/1e Move-
ment of Goods in Inters/ale Commerce, in I COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 174 (T. Sandalow & 
E. Stein eds. 1982) (as to U.S. law); Schermers, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the 
Free Movement of Goods, in I COURTS AND FREE MARKETS, supra, at 222 (as to Community 
law). 
51. See note 27 supra. 
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in Spirits.52 This duty on imported spirits is of the same amount as the 
duty, called the "spirits surcharge," on certain domestic spirits whose pro-
ducers are exempt from the obligation to deliver all domestic spirits to the 
Federal Monopoly Administration. Liquor wines with an alcohol content 
of more than fourteen percent by volume are considered spirits and are 
liable to a monopoly equalization duty calculated on the quantity of alco-
hol in excess of fourteen percent by volume. The point of contention was 
that, provided certain conditions were met, the "spirits surcharge" applying 
to domestic spirits was reduced, but such reduction was not extended to 
imported port wines. Kupferberg claimed that the refusal to extend this 
reduction to imported port wine was illegal. It relied, inter alia, on a provi-
sion of the Agreement between the EEC and Portugal signed in Brussels on 
July 22, 1972 and concluded and adopted on behalf of the Community by 
Council Regulation.53 The provision in question, article 21, paragraph 1, 
provides that "The Contracting Parties shall refrain from any measure or 
practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing, whether directly or indi-
rectly, discrimination between the products of one Contracting Party and 
like products originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party."54 
Pursuant to article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the Bundesfinanzhof referred a 
series of questions to the Court of Justice, relating, among other things, to 
the direct applicability of article 21 of the Portugal Agreement and to its 
meaning. 
In reaching its conclusion that "[t]he first paragraph of article 21 of the 
Agreement between the Community and Portugal is directly applicable and 
capable of conferring on individual traders rights which the courts must 
protect,"55 the Court of Justice made a series of important pronouncements. 
First, elaborating on earlier decisions, the Court of Justice stated that 
international agreements made by the Community "form an integral part of 
the Community legal system"; that where the implementing measures are to 
be taken by Member States, the Member States in so doing fulfill an obliga-
tion "above all in relation to the Community which has assumed responsi-
bility for the due performance of the agreement";56 and that the effect in the 
Community of such an agreement is the subject of Community law and not 
of the internal legal order of each Member State. 
Second, having thus recognized the "Community nature" of the Portu-
gal Agreement,57 the Court of Justice dealt with the various arguments, 
derived from the structure of the agreement, which Member States had ad-
vanced against the direct enforceability of the agreement as such.58 Most of 
these arguments related directly or indirectly to the proper division of pow-
ers within the Community legal system between the legislative and the ex-
52. Branntweinmonopolgesetz (Law on the monopoly in spirits), 1922 RGBL 405 ('N. 
Ger.). 
53. See note 26 supra, at 165. 
54. See note 26 supra, at 170. 
55. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3670. 
56. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3662 (ground 13). 
57. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3662 (ground 14). 
58. The Commission's position was more subtle and had shifted since Polydor. See text at 
note 75 infra. 
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ecutive, on the one hand, and the judiciary, on the other, with respect to the 
Community's external relations. They were intended to demonstrate the 
existence of fundamental differences between judicial enforcement of the 
EEC Treaty and of Community international agreements. They conveyed 
the idea that judicial enforcement of agreements at the initiative of private 
parties would fetter the necessary freedom of the legislature and the execu-
tive in the field of external relations of the Community and that such en-
forcement would be inappropriate, counterproductive and would interfere 
with the consultation and negotiation procedures of such agreements. 
The Court of Justice did not consider these arguments sufficient to con-
clude that the nature or the structure of the Portugal Agreement, as such, 
could prevent a trader from relying on the provisions thereof before a court 
in the Community. However, the reasoning of the Court of Justice con-
tained some qualifying elements which will be examined later. 
Third, the Court of Justice turned then to the analysis of the provision 
itself. It decided that the question of whether the provision was uncondi-
tional and sufficiently precise to have direct effect had to be examined "in 
the light of both the object and purpose of the Agreement and of its con-
text."59 Noting that the purpose of the Agreement was to create a system of 
free trade, and that it provides for the elimination of rules restricting com-
merce in virtually all trade, the Court of Justice found that article 21 sought 
to prevent this elimination of restrictions from being rendered nugatory by 
fiscal practices of the Contracting Parties. Finding that the application of 
this unconditional rule against fiscal discrimination "is dependent only on a 
finding that the products affected by a particular system of taxation are of 
like nature," the Court of Justice concluded that this rule could thus pro-
duce direct effects throughout the Community.60 
A. On the "Nature" ef an International Agreement 
When it held in earlier cases that an international agreement formed 
"an integral part of Community law,"61 the Court of Justice decided that 
the effects of such international agreements were to be determined by Com-
munity law and not by the laws of the Member States. The issue of whether 
those effects would be determined, in view of the agreement's international 
nature, in the same manner as for any other piece of Community law was 
not clarified. 
Kupferberg makes clear that an international agreement, once it has be-
come internationally binding on the Community, not only becomes "the 
law of the land" but also that, as such, it cannot be deprived in principle of 
"direct effect." This does not, however, imply that for the purposes of "di-
rect effect," the international nature of the Portugal Agreement is entirely 
disregarded and that it is fully assimilated into Community law proper. 
First, the Court of Justice declared that it will only decide on the effects 
59. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3665 (ground 23). In Polydor, 1982 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 346 (ground 8), the criteria are worded differently: "in the light of both 
the object and purpose of the Agreement and of its wording." They are probably intended to 
mean the same thing. 
60. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3665 (grounds 24 to 26). 
61. Haegeman, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 460 (ground 5). 
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of an international agreement in the Community legal order if the con-
tracting parties did not settle that question in the agreement themselves.62 
At first blush this may appear to be stating the obvious. In so doing, how-
ever, the Court of Justice addressed one of the policy arguments of the 
Member States and the Commission. What the Court of Justice said is that, 
if judicial enforcement of an agreement is considered inappropriate or 
counterproductive, as Member States and the Commission had argued, it is 
up to the Community institutions to exclude it by inserting appropriate 
clauses in the agreement. More importantly, by leaving to the Council and 
the Commission the discretion to exclude judicial review in international 
agreements, the Court of Justice established a major distinction between the 
direct effect of international agreements and of Community law proper, 
where such discretion is manifestly excluded by the general principles of the 
Treaty.63 
Second, it had been argued both in Polydor and in Kupferberg that it 
would be a breach of reciprocity if the courts of only one of the contracting 
parties recognized the direct effect of agreements. Much reliance had been 
put on certain countries' supreme court opinions relating to free-trade 
agreements between those countries and the Community.64 The Court of 
Justice found that 
the fact that the courts of one of the parties consider that certain of the 
stipulations in the agreement are of direct application whereas the courts of 
the other party do not recognize such direct application is not in itself such 
as to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation of the 
agreement.65 
The door is, however, left open for the reciprocity argument. The statement 
is qualified by the reservation that there must, at any rate, be bona fide 
performance of the agreement by the other party using the means of its 
domestic legal system appropriate for executing fully the commitments 
which it has undertaken. 
Absence of reciprocity, in the sense of nonperformance by one party, 
may entitle the other party to suspend the execution of its obligations under 
an agreement as an exceptio non-adimpleti contractus. 66 In Kupferberg, the 
Court of Justice seems to imply that, where such absence of reciprocity 
could be established, the Court would take this into account in deciding 
whether an individual should be able to enforce the agreement in question. 
It has been argued that national courts do not normally take reciprocity 
62. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3663 (ground 17). 
63. This does not, however, imply that the Community "legislator" has in all circum-
stances the duty to draft his legislation in such a way as to create directly enforceable rights for 
individuals. 
64. See, e.g., Austrian Supreme Court, judgment of IO July 1979, Austra-Mechana v. 
Gramola Winter & Co., (1980) REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR No. 104; Sun-
light AG v. Bosshard Partner Intertrading, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Vol. 3 at 664 (1980) 
(Swiss Fed. S. Ct., 1979); Ling!, International Trade: Conflict Between Swiss Trademark Law 
and EEC Trade Agreement, 21 HARV. INTL. L.J. 756 (1980). 
65. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3664 (ground 18). 
66. Cj Tomuschat, supra note 5, at 812. For an examination of the theoretical underpin-
nings and the practice, see Decaux, La Reciprocite en Droit International in BIBLIOTHEQUE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (C. Rousseau ed. 1980). 
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into account when interpreting international agreements or when consider-
ing the effect of international agreements in their legal system, 67 and that, 
where the judiciary does so, as in France, it enters into almost inextricable 
difficulties.68 On the other hand, it may be argued that these courts have 
never given the same far-reaching effect to international agreements as the 
"direct effect" granted by the Court of Justice to Community law.69 There 
certainly are weighty arguments - e.g., the introduction into the applica-
tion of the law of an "element of political evaluation that cannot be calcu-
lated"70 - against judicial involvement. However, once the judiciary is 
called upon to enforce an international agreement, it does not seem out of 
order for the judiciary to take into account possible manifest and substan-
tial nonperformance by the other party that would completely upset the 
balance of an agreement. 
The interesting point is that the Court of Justice apparently did not rule 
out the possibility of denying "direct effect" to an international agreement 
on the ground of nonperformance by the other contracting party, i.e., ab-
sence of substantive reciprocity. This is another important distinction, from 
the point of view of the direct effect doctrine, between international agree-
ments and Community law proper: neither the refusal of a national court 
to grant direct effect to a provision of purely Community origin, nor the 
failure of a Member State to comply otherwise with its obligations under 
Community law, can in any way justify a denial of "direct effect" in or by 
another Member State. 
B. On the "Structure" of the Portugal Agreement 
In both Polydor and Kupferberg several Member States argued against 
the direct enforceability of the Portugal Agreement by individuals, and the 
Commission had argued for a limited enforceability, on the basis of the 
"direct effect" doctrine of Community law. Seeking to avoid the transposi-
tion of this doctrine to international agreements, they stressed the structural 
differences between the EEC Treaty and classical international agreements, 
emphasizing distinctive substantive and legal features of the EEC Treaty, 
such as its wide-ranging scope, aims going far beyond trade matters, and its 
common institutions endowed with sovereign law-making powers. 
Kupferberg did not enter into this discussion. The Court of Justice lim-
ited its reasoning to the arguments relating to the Portugal Agreement itself. 
The Court found that neither the existence of a special institutional frame-
work for consultations and negotiations, established by the contracting par-
ties inter se, nor the possibility that contracting parties could derogate from 
the Agreement pursuant to safeguard clauses, was sufficient in itself to ex-
clude the direct applicability "which may attach to certain stipulations in 
the agreement."71 
67. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 5, at 815-16 (as to Germany). In the United States, 
the judiciary would leave it to the political branch to decide. See Decaux, supra note 66, at 
268-69. 
68. See Groux, supra note 36, at 230. 
69. Bebr, supra note 10, at 72. 
70. Tomuschat, supra note 5, at 818. 
71. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3664 (ground 21). 
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This gives rise to two comments. First, the Court's benign neglect of the 
structural differences between the law of the EEC Treaty and the law of the 
Portugal Agreement is surprising, since it was precisely the structural weak-
nesses of the GATT law that led the Court of Justice to exclude possible 
direct applicability of GATT provisions. Quite clearly, Kupferberg does 
not herald a new direction on the direct applicability of GATT. The latest 
GATT rulings of March 16, 1983, refer unambiguously to earlier judgments 
in the following terms: 
The Court reached that conclusion on the basis of considerations concern-
ing the general scheme of GA TT, namely that it was based on the principle 
of negotiations undertaken on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous ba-
sis and was characterized by the great flexibility of its provisions, in partic-
ular those concerning the possibilities of derogation, the measures which 
might be taken in cases of exceptional difficulty and the settlement of dif-
ferences between the contracting parties.72 
On the face of it, the "structure" of the Portugal Agreement does not 
differ greatly from that of the GATT. At any rate, it is much closer to the 
structure of the GATT than to that of the EEC Treaty. Since the Court of 
Justice has not offered any clues, any explanation of this difference in ap-
proach is a venture into the realm of speculation, but the following consid-
erations may have played a part. The Community agreements are ''young"; 
their legal personality is at present being shaped. The GA TT is "mature"; it 
has already acquired a certain legal personality that probably makes it less 
capable of judicial enforcement.73 In addition, Community agreements, 
such as the Portugal Agreement, are bilateral agreements: the unilateral 
decision of one party to recognize their direct enforceability in the domestic 
system, expecting thus to enhance their efficacy in general, is still a gamble 
but with far better odds than in the case of multilateral agreements. 
Finally, there undoubtedly is a qualitative difference between the 
GATT and agreements such as the Portugal Agreement, whose essential 
feature is the establishment of a free-trade area which goes beyond the 
scheme and the objectives of GATT. This differential treatment by the 
Court of Justice is timely. In formal proceedings, instituted in GATT in 
1983 against the preferential customs treatment of citrus fruit under some 
such agreements, the United States disputed the Community's claim that 
the agreements are genuinely aimed at establishing free-trade areas within 
the meaning of article XXIV of GATT. 
Second, the disregard for the structural differences between the EEC 
Treaty and an international agreement is not absolute. It does not imply 
that the provisions of an international agreement are then, for all other pur-
poses, treated without further ado as if they were provisions of purely Com-
munity origin. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether, precisely in view of 
their different context, international provisions are subjected to the same 
"direct effect" test as Community provisions. Moreover, these structural 
differences may be relevant to the substantive interpretation of similarly 
worded provisions. 
72. SPI, 1983 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 830 (ground 23). 
73. See, e.g., Hudec, The GAIT Legal System· A .Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J.W.T.L. 615 
(1970). 
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C. On the "IJirect Effect" Test for International Provisions 
Leaving certain variations aside, a Community law provision can be 
said to have "direct effect" where it imposes a clear and unconditional obli-
gation, the implementation or effectiveness of which is not dependent upon 
further acts. As the evolution of the case law shows, this "direct effect" test 
is not neutral; it does not operate as a chemical formula. What is "clear" 
and "unconditional" depends to some extent on the "value" which one at-
tributes to the obligation. Bearing this in mind, in the observations it sub-
mitted both in Polydor and Kupferberg, the Commission suggested a 
distinction between the "hard core" of the Portugal Agreement, such as 
provisions prohibiting customs duties and quotas, and the surrounding grey 
area, proposing to grant direct effect only to "hard core" provisions.74 
The judgments rendered so far do not permit one to draw conclusions as 
to the direct effect test to be applied to international provisions. In Polydor 
the Court of Justice avoided the issue of "direct effect."75 Neither in 
Bresciani76 nor in Kupferberg were the provisions in question such as to 
leave much room for interpretation. The provision which was at stake in 
Pabst did raise a problem in this respect; however, Pabst concerned the 
Association Agreement with Greece,77 a country which in the meantime 
had acceded to the Community. It can hardly be treated as a precedent 
applicable to other international agreements. 
"Clarity" and "unconditionality" must depend on the wording of each 
provision of an international agreement and, when these provisions mirror 
Community law provisions, on the substantive interpretation of the Com-
munity law provisions. Although strictly speaking this no longer relates to 
the "direct effect" of a provision, in practical, economic and political terms 
there is an obvious link between such effect, with its guarantee of judicial 
enforcement, and the substantive interpretation of an international provi-
sion. Quite evidently, the broader the scope of a provision and the wider 
the room for judicial interpretation, the more difficult it is for political bod-
ies to accept enforcement by the judiciary. 
D. On the Substantive Interpretation of International Agreements 
Granted that provisions of international agreements have "direct effect" 
in the Community legal system, are such provisions then to be interpreted 
in the same way as similarly worded EEC Treaty provisions? 
It is on this point that the major difference, apart from limitations on the 
recognition of the direct effect of provisions of international agreements, 
appears between international agreements and Community law proper. In-
deed, as has been made clear in several other judgments,78 the Court of 
14. Kupferberg, 1982 E. Co=. Ct. Rep. at 3652-56. 
15. See text at notes 25-29 Sllpra. 
76. 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 129. 
77. Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg (Case No. 17/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 1331, 1333 (Preliminary Ruling). 
18. See, e.g., Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348; Procureur de la Republique, 
Besan~n v. Bouhelier (Case 225/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3151, 3160 (Preliminary 
Ruling); EMI Records v. CBS U.K. (Case 51/75), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 811, 847 (Prelim-
inary Ruling). The only apparent exception is Bresciani, 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 141-42, 
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Justice decided in Kupferberg that similarity of terms is not a sufficient rea-
son for transposing to the provisions of international agreements the case 
law on provisions of the EEC Treaty dealing with intra-Community trade. 
The clearest statement of the reasoning on which the Court of Justice 
relied appears inPolydor. The Court of Justice first stressed the structural 
differences between the EEC Treaty and the Portugal Agreement. Refer-
ring to its case law interpreting the EEC Treaty provisions, the Court of 
Justice emphasized that its scope "must indeed be determined in the light of 
the Community's objectives and activities" and recalled that "the Treaty, 
by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the eco-
nomic policies of the Member States, seeks to unite national markets into a 
single market having the characteristics of a domestic market."79 In con-
trast, the Portugal Agreement, "although it makes provision for the uncon-
ditional abolition of certain restrictions . . . and measures having 
equivalent effect," does not have the same purpose as the EEC Treaty. 80 
Second, there is also, according to the Court of Justice, an institutional 
difference. A distinction as to interpretation between EEC Treaty provi-
sions and similarly worded provisions of the Portugal Agreement 
is all the more necessary inasmuch as the instruments which the Commu-
nity has at its disposal in order to achieve the uniform application of Com-
munity law and the progressive abolition of legislative disparities within 
the common market have no equivalent in the context of the relations be-
tween the Community and Portugal.81 
In Po!ydor, this led to the conclusion that, unlike articles 30 and 36 of 
the EEC Treaty, concerning intra-Community trade, the similarly worded 
provisions of the Portugal Agreement do not exclude a prohibition, based 
on the protection of copyright, on the importation into the Community of a 
product originating in Portugal. A comparison between the substantive in-
terpretation of article 21, paragraph 1 of the Portugal Agreement in 
Kupferberg and the interpretation of the corresponding EEC Treaty provi-
sion (article 95, first paragraph) is made more difficult by the facts of the 
case - no like product was manufactured in Germany - and some textual 
differences between the two provisions. 
The Court of Justice has been less clear, however, on how it will inter-
pret international agreements in future cases.82 In Polydor it stated that "it 
is necessary to analyse the provisions in the light of both the object and 
purpose of the Agreement and of its wording."83 In and by themselves, 
these criteria, when applied to international agreements, are "more sensible 
in which the agreement expressly referred to article 13 of the EEC Treaty as such, in conform-
ity with articles 132 and 133 of the Treaty. 
79. Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348 (ground 16). 
80. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 349 (ground 18). 
81. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 329 (ground 20). Such an approach finds support in 
international law. See Schermers, The Direct Application of Treaties with Third States: Note 
Concerning the Polydor and Pabst Cases, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 563, 568 (1982). 
82. Sektkellerei CA v. Hauptzollamt Mainz (Case No. 253/83, filed Nov. 11, 1983) (Refer-
ence for a Preliminary Ruling) is pending before the Court of Justice involving fiscal discrimi-
nation both in intra-Community trade and trade with Spain and Portugal. 
83. Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 346 (ground 8). 
1270 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 82:1250 
than the rather specious intent-of-the-parties test not uncommonly used in 
various national systems."84 
From such a statement and from the absence of transposition of the case 
law on Community law provisions, the following general indications may 
reasonably be inferred. Existing interpretations relating to similarly 
worded Community law provisions are useful only to the extent that they 
do not relate to the purpose of the EEC Treaty, which seeks to create a 
single market reproducing as closely as possible the conditions of a domes-
tic market.85 This is particularly relevant for provisions of international 
agreements relating to charges on imports other than customs duties, to 
measures applying specifically to imported products other than import bans 
or import quotas, to discrimination in taxation and in domestic legislation 
on manufacturing, marketing, and so on, to competition, and to state aid. 
To be compatible with an international agreement it will be sufficient 
that a measure having a restrictive effect on trade, be either justified by an 
exception or a derogation or pursue an aim which is legitimate under the 
agreement. Neither the restrictive effect86 nor the aim87 of such a measure 
will be weighed against the broader objectives of the agreement. This kind 
of assessment, in which considerations of expediency have a large part to 
play, is left to the contracting parties. 
E. International Agreements as "the Supreme Law of the Land" 
There is one major question left; i.e., in case of conflict between an in-
ternational agreement and Community law, which will prevail over the 
other in the Community legal system? In other words, does the recognition 
of "direct effect" carry with it its corollary - supremacy - under Commu-
nity law? The answer to this question is still outstanding. Since they in-
volved conflicts between international agreements concluded by the 
Community and provisions of the law of a Member State, Kupferberg, 
Pabst and Polydor are, as such, not relevant in deciding how to solve a 
conflict between an international agreement and Community law. There is 
no past case law solving this conflict one way or another. And, apart from 
some obiter dicta, 88 there are no indications on how such a conflict would 
84. Riesenfeld, The .Doctrine of Se!f-Executing Treaties and Community Law: A Pioneer 
.Decisio'!, of the Court of Justice of the European Community, 67 AM. J. INTL. L. 504, S07 
(1973). 
85. Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348 (ground 16). 
86. See the distinction between intra-Community trade and trade with third countries 
made ininternational Fruit, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1107. See also EMI, 1976 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. at 811. 
87. In Polydor, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 329, the injunction restraining the sale and 
distribution of the imported records was tantamount to an import ban. The aim which the 
restrictive measure pursued, i.e., the protection of the copyright, was accepted; the Court of 
Justice did not examine whether this aim and the restrictive effect of the measures outweighed 
the objectives of the Agreement. 
88. For example, in I. Schroeder KG v. Federal Republic of Germany (Case No. 40/72), 
1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 125, 135 (Preliminary Ruling), the Court of Justice stated that, in 
any event, when the Commission took protective measures against imports from Greece, it was 
bound to comply with the provisions of the Association Agreement. 
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be resolved. Furthermore, as explained earlier,89 the institutional provi-
sions under which the Court of Justice operates do not offer any guidance 
on this front. In the last analysis, the answer to this question depends, on 
the one hand, on the extent to which, according to the Court of Justice, the 
enforcement of the international rule of law should take precedence over 
more immediate, specific Community interests, and, on the other hand, on 
what the Court of Justice perceives as being its mandate in this connection. 
As stated earlier,90 the cautious attitude taken by the Court of Justice so 
far, which is even more striking when compared to the judicial activism 
displayed with respect to the enforcement of Community law proper, is un-
derstandable, but also probably means that the Court of Justice is very di-
vided. Any possible inference to be drawn from the case law must 
consequently be taken cum grano salis. Thus, it is true that in the past the 
Court of Justice has, possibly more so than U.S. courts,9 I made every effort 
to interpret Community law so as to avoid a conflict with Community inter-
national law obligations.92 This may be construed as a willingness to ex-
amine an international agreement on its merits and an implicit acceptance 
of its enforceability.93 However, this phenomenon may be explained 
equally well by the reluctance - again quite understandable - to address 
the issue of the conflict. Similarly, as mentioned earlier,94 where it took 
cognizance of international law the Court of Justice did so more for the 
benefit of uniformity of Community law than for the sake of upholding 
international law. Moreover, the opinions in question dealt with actual or 
potential conflicts between Member State law and international agreement, 
not between Community law and international agreements. The rationale 
was a Missouri v. Holland95 one, rather than a Foster and Elam 96 one. 
Yet, there is an unmistakably open attitude vis-a-vis international law 
and a willingness to take it into consideration. This results not only from 
the recognition that international agreements for the protection of human 
rights, in which Member States participate or to which they have adhered, 
contain elements which must be taken into account within the framework 
of Community law.97 It also results from the fact that, in those cases where 
89. See text at notes 32-35 supra. 
90. See text at notes 21-29 supra. 
91. For a discussion of the attitude of the U.S. courts, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1975). 
92. See, e.g., Caciali, 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 2773;Henn, 1979 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 
at 3795; Razanatsimba, 1977 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 229; Haegeman, 1974 E. Co=. Ct. J. 
Rep. at 449; Schroeder, 1973 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 125; see also Commission of the Eur. 
Economic Co=unities v. Council of the Eur. Communities, (Case No. 218/82), 1984 COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 14,019 (Ct. J. Eur. Co=., Dec. 13, 1983), digested in 1983 ECJR 126 
(in which the Court interpreted a regulation implementing a clause of the Lome Agreement 
guaranteeing ACP countries the development of their traditional trade of rum with the Com-
munity and the Member States in such a way that it did not violate the EEC Treaty). 
93. See Pescatore, supra note 11, at 678. 
94. See text at notes 39-47 supra. 
95. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
96. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
97. See, e.g., J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the Eur. 
Communities (Case No. 4/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491. This technique has been used 
repeatedly in later cases with reference to the European Human Rights Convention. 
1272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1250 
it gave precedence to international agreements over Member States' law, 
the Court of Justice could conceivably have achieved the opposite result by 
denying expressly that the international agreement gave rise to directly en-
forceable rights. 
In the light of this, it does not seem impossible, or even improbable, that 
if and when the issue arises, the Court of Justice will give precedence to 
international agreements over inconsistent provisions of purely Community 
origin. For reasons that will be set out in the conclusion of this contribu-
tion, such a development is to be welcomed, provided that account is taken 
of the qualifying elements to which the recognition of "direct effect" to in-
ternational agreements has been subjected, and provided that certain ac-
companying measures are taken. 
Ill. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Tjie cautious and pragmatic attitude displayed by the Court of Justice 
should not obscure the fact that in the end, particularly in the light of 
Kupferberg, it has transposed its doctrine of the direct effect of Community 
law to the quite different setting of the law of international agreements. It 
has taken account of the differences by granting such "direct effect" only in 
the absence of a contrary decision of the contracting parties in the interna-
tional agreement. Moreover, it has left open the possibility of denying di-
rect effect where the contracting party does not offer substantive reciprocity 
in its implementation of the agreement. Finally, the different "structure" of 
an international agreement may in certain cases - e.g., GAIT- lead to 
the exclusion of direct effect, and in others to stricter requirements as to the 
"clarity" and "unconditionality" of the provisions. 
The corollary of direct effect, i.e., supremacy of Community law over 
inconsistent national law, has been recognized in relation to international 
agreements vis-a-vis the law of the Member States. Whether this 
supremacy also applies vis-a-vis inconsistent Community law is still an 
open question. However, subject to the same "direct effect" limits to which 
international agreements are subject vis-a-vis Member State law, 
supremacy should also be granted to international agreements over incon-
sistent Community law. 
The qualified transposition of the direct effect doctrine to international 
agreements does not require that the substantive interpretation of intra-
Community law also be transposed to international agreements. The provi-
sions of such agreements are to be interpreted "in the light of both the ob-
jective and the purpose" of these agreements and of their wording. 
The direct effect of international agreements is subject to certain neces-
sary qualifications which reflect the different nature and structure of such 
agreements. The enforcement of international agreements as an "integral 
part of Community law," through the device of "direct effect," is likely to 
further significantly the uniform and effective application of "external" 
Community law, just as, in the past, the possibility of individuals enforcing 
Community law having "direct effect" has proved the major tool in achiev-
ing uniform and effective application of "internal" Community law. Its 
role may even turn out to be relatively more important than in "internal" 
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Community law. Commission proceedings against Member States for 
breaches of "internal" Community law are frequent, whereas there are 
practically none for breaches of "external" Community law. 
The decision not to give the same interpretation to similarly worded 
provisions of the EEC Treaty and of international agreements is entirely 
justified. Moreover, the resulting interpretation is not inconsistent with that 
followed by the Community's contracting parties. Finally, it is hard to see 
how, as a matter of practical politics, the Council of Ministers could have 
taken corrective legislative action comparable to the legislation of some of 
the Community's trading partners, if the far-reaching interpretations of "in-
ternal" Community law had been transposed to trade with third countries. 
These developments in the case law of the Court of Justice are to be 
welcomed. They are in line with the Community's legislative policy. In its 
legislative practice the Community is, as a rule, aware of its international 
obligations, conscious of the need to comply with them and intent on doing 
so.98 Intentional breaches of international obligations may, for all practical 
purposes, be excluded. The question of whether the way in which the Com-
munity interprets its obligations is shared by its contracting parties is an-
other matter. The difficulty and the risk of fully asymetric interpretations, 
with their implications for the balance of advantages between contracting 
parties, require increased efforts to establish appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanisms, a greater willingness to use such mechanisms and the readi-
ness to abide by their results. Furthermore, at a time when the recognition 
of the Community as a full-fledged participant in international relations 
still meets with opposition, be it for reasons of international policy or poli-
tics or because of a genuine distrust vis-a-vis this new breed of international 
body, it would be misguided to create the impression that the Community is 
somehow holding back in honoring its international commitments to the 
fullest extent possible. 
Last but not least, these developments also have their merits from the 
point of view of international law. Assuming that, in bringing them about, 
the Court of Justice desired that the Community contribute to the improved 
enforcement of the international rule of law, such a goal does not appear 
unrealistic or inordinate. After all, in the field of international trade the 
Community's weight equals that of the United States and Japan combined. 
In light of its position, these developments are consistent with the Commu-
nity's responsibility. 
98. There is no provision to be found in Community law comparable to sec. 3(a) of the 
U.S. 1979 Trade Agreement Act stating that, in case of conflict with any statute of the United 
States, provisions of the agreement referred to have no effect under domestic U.S. law. Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 § 3(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1982). 
